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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
to pay his debts, while at the same time spendthrifts may be prevented from
becoming public charges.
Recognizing the rightful place that this doctrine has acquired in the
American juridical organization, it can be seen that there is an ever-present
need for circumspect restraint of its growth by means of comprehensive
legislation such as has been adopted by other states3 3 and through chary
interpretation by the courts.
MARJORIE SEWELL HOLT
LEGISLATIVE NOTES
THE FLORIDA FAIR TRADE ACT: CONSTITUTIONAL
OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Florida Laws 1949, c. 25204
Through the years man has attempted to steer the "Golden Rule" into
the channel of his business experiences. A noteworthy portion of his
energies has been directed toward the furtherance of "fair" trade practices
free from undue monopolies or other practices restraining free and open
competition. Especially in the United States, where supply and demand
have usually determined price, has our economy been built on the ideal
of free competition.1
The plight of the small independent retailer became precarious when
large manufacturers began to indulge in discriminatory distribution prac-
tices favoring more economical marketing techniques that were developed
by department and chain stores. These conditions, in addition to sharp
competition among the small retailers themselves, caused the concept of
resale price maintenance to emerge into national prominence. 2
"CAL. Civ. CODE §859 (1941); MicH. CoMp. LAWS §8092 (Mason 1929); MINNi.
STAT. ANN. §8092 (Mason 1927); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §6788 (1935); N. Y. RFAL
PROP. LAW §98; N. D. REV. CODE §59-0310 (1943); OKLA. STAT. it. 60, §140 (1941);
S. D. CODE §590306 (1939); Wis. STAT. §231.13 (1947).
'1 CALL AN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKs 355 (1945).
2McLAuGHxK, Fair Trade Acts, 86 U. oF PA. L. REV. 803 (1938).
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In essence, resale price maintenance is "that system of distributing
trade-marked articles by which the trade-mark owner fixes the price at
which his trade-marked goods are to be sold by wholesalers and retailers
irrespective of their individual contractual relations with the trade-mark
owner." 3 The most common device employed to effect resale price main-
tenance 4 is the "vertical trade agreement," whereby the manufacturer of a
branded or trade-marked commodity attempts to impose a stipulated re-
sale price upon a distributor and all subsequent retailers. 5
Prior to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890,6 vertical trade agree-
ments fixing prices of trade-marked goods were generally recognized as
valid, at least when the agreement did not constitute common-law unfair
competition.7 In the Dr. Miles case of 1911,8 however, the United States
Supreme Court finally declared such a vertical trade agreement to be an
unlawful restraint on trade under the Sherman Act. In an effort to obviate
the undesirable result of this decision, several states enacted fair trade laws
that legalized these vertical trade agreements and provided a method by
which they could be enforced. 9 These statutes, nevertheless, were largely
31 CALLMAm, THE LAW OF UNFAIR CommoN AND TRADE MARKs 358 (1945).
'Other devices employed are: the rebate system, whereby a manufacturer agrees
to allow a rebate to those who will maintain a price set by him, John D. Park &
Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136 (1903);
the agency system, whereby a manufacturer constitutes another his sole agent to sell
his goods at a set price, Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U. S. 8 (1913); and
the refusal to sell to price cutters, United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300
(1919). All of these devices have been held legal.
'Vertical trade agreements should be carefully distinguished from "horizontal"
trade agreements. Horizontal trade agreements are made between persons of the
same class, such as between manufacturers, or between wholesalers. These types of
agreements are illegal under the Sherman Act of 1890. Old Dearborn Distributing Co.
v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. 1 (1946).
'Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88 (1889); Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174
(1900); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 50 N. Y.
Supp. 1064 (1896); Elliman Sons & Co. v. Carrington, 2 Ch. 275 (Eng. 1901).
8Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911). The
same result was indicated by earlier decisions under the Sherman Act. Scribner v.
Straus, 210 U. S. 352 (1908); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1908); In
re-Green, 52 Fed. 104 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1892).
'CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE §16900 (1943) (derived from Cal. Laws 1931, c. 278, as
amended by Cal. Laws 1933, c. 260, to include the non-signer clause); ILL. Ray. STAT.
c. 121'/, §188 et seq. (1947) (derived from fl1. Laws 1935, p. 1436, §1); IowA Conz
c. 431.1 (1935); N. J. Rv. STAT. §56:4-3, 4, 5, 6 (1937) (derived from N. J. Laws.
1935, c. 58); N. Y. GEr. Bus. LAW §369, a-e (derived from N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 976).
These statutes all contain substantially the same essential provisions. For a typical
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 3 [1949], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss3/6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
ineffective, since the vertical contracts remained illegal in interstate com-
merce under the decision in the Dr. Miles case.' 0
Constitutional doubts of these fair trade acts were increased when the
New York Court of Appeals held the New York act unconstitutional as
violating due process, denying equal protection of laws, and constituting
an unlawful delegation of legislative authority." In 1936, however, the
Illinois and California courts held similar acts constitutional.1 2 On appeal
from these decisions, the United States Supreme Court affirmed them as
valid under the Federal Constitution. 13 On the strength of the Supreme
Court decisions, the New York Court overruled its prior decision; 1 4 and in
the same year Congress enacted the Miller-Tydings Amendment' 5 to the
form used by many states, see note 20 infra, setting forth parts of the Florida fair
trade law.
"0See Schll v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 17 A.2d 175, 180 (1941).
"Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409
(1936); Coty, Inc. v. Hearn Dept. Stores, Inc., 158 Misc. 516, 284 N. Y. Supp. 909
(1935). These cases were reversed on the authority of Old Dearborn Distributing
Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936), which was rendered shortly
after the Doubleday case. Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N.
E.2d 30 (1937). The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed Johnson &
Johnson v. Weissbard, 120 N. J. Eq. 314, 184 At. 783 (1931), a lower court decision
holding the act unconstitutional as delegating legislative authority to private individ-
uals and depriving retailers of due process of laws, in Johnson & Johnson v. Weiss-
bard, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 Atl. 873 (1937).
"Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 784, 55 P.2d 177 (1936); Pyroil Sales
Co. v. Pep Boys, 91 Cal. 367, 55 P.2d 194 (1936); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil,
363 I1. 559, 2 N. E.2d 929 (1936); Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distri-
buting Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N. E.2d 940 (1936).
"Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S. 198 (1936) ; Old Dearborn Distributing
Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936). The Court expressly ruled
that the fair trade acts did not violate due process of law, deny equal protection of
laws, nor constitute an unlawful delegation of power to private persons in so far
as the United States Constitution was concerned. At page 192 of the Old Dearborn
case Mr. Justice Sutherland stated:
"It is clear that this section does not attempt to fix prices, nor does it delegate
such power to private persons. It permits the designated private persons to
contract with respect thereto. It contains no element of compulsion but simply
legalizes their acts, leaving them free to enter into the authorized contract or
not as they may see fit."
and on page 197:
"As this court many times has said, the equal-protection clause does not pre-
clude the states from resorting to classification for the purposes of legislation
.... Enough appears already in this opinion to show the essential difference
between trade-marked goods and others not so identified."
"Bourjois Sales Corp v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E.2d 30 (1937).
"'26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §1 (1946).
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Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which legalized vertical trade agreements in inter-
state commerce when legal in any state where the resale was made. Other
states were quick to reap the benefits promised by-these decisions; and
today forty-five states have adopted "fair trade acts"'16 that have been
upheld in some fifteen states.
17
Florida's first fair trade law was enacted in 193718 but was held un-
constitutional in 1939 because of a defect in title.' 9 It was subsequently
amended, however, to remove this objection.20 The Florida fair trade
"'All states but Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have
adopted these acts in one form or another. For a list of the statutes see 3 CALLmAN,
THE LAW or UNFAnR Coa TinoN AND TRADE MARKS 1764, App. III (1945).
"Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 5 Cal.2d 784, 55 P.2d 194 (1936); Carroll v.
Schwartz, 127 Conn. 126, 14 A.2d 754 (1940); Auto Rental Co. v. Lee, 35 Haw. 77
(1939); Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill. 61, 2 N.
E.2d 940 (1936); Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942);
Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939); Weco Products
Co. v. Sam's Cut Rate, 296 Mich. 190, 295 N. W. 611 (1941); Johnson & Johnson v.
Weissbard, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 Atl. 873 (1937); Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman,
273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E.2d 30 (1937); Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163,
4 S. E.2d 528 (1939); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Brothers, 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843
(1939); Miles Laboratories ,v. Owl Drug Co, 67 S. D. 523, 295 N. W. 292 (1940);
Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, 10 Wash.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756 (1941);
Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937).
"Florida Laws 1937, c. 18395. See note 20 infra.
"Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
"Florida Laws 1939, c. 19201, now FLA. STAT. §§541.01-08.
Section 541.03 provides:
"No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears,
or the label or container of which bears, the trade-mark, brand, or name of the
producer or distributor of such commodity and which commodity is in free and
open competition with commodites of the same general class produced or distri-
buted by others shall be deemed in violation of any law of the State of Florida
by reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in such
contract:
(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity at less than the mini-
mum price stipulated by the seller;
(b) That the buyer will require of any dealer to whom he may resell
such commodity an agreement that he will not, in turn, resell at less than
the minimum price stipulated by the seller;
(c) That the seller will not sell such commodity
(1) To any wholesaler, unless such wholesaler will agree not to resell
the same to any retailer unless the retailer will in turn agree not to resell the
same except to consumers for use and at not less than the stipulated mini-
mum price, and such wholesaler will likewise agree not to resell the same
to any other wholesaler unless such other wholesaler will make the same
agreement with any wholesaler or retailer to whom he may resell; or
4
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law was again held invalid in 1949 under the Florida and United States
Constitutions in Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corporation.2 1
Within two months after this decision was rendered, the 1949 session of
the Florida Legislature again amended the Florida fair trade law in an
obvious effort to remove constitutional stumbling blocks.2 2 In its amend-
ed form it contains, in addition to its previous provisions, various findings
of fact concerning the act and statements of its purpose. There is also a
proviso permitting the attorney general to bring suit for the purpose of
restraining enforcement of any resale price agreement when he finds that
the trade-marked commodity covered by the trade agreement is not in
free and open competition with other commodities of the same general
class.2
3
(2) To any retailer, unless the retailer will agree not to resell the
same except to consumers for use and at not less than the stipulated mini-
mum price."
Section 541.06 provides that such a contract shall not preclude resale in closing out
the owner's stock for the bona fide purpose of continuing dealing in any such com-
modity; when the goods are altered, second-hand or damaged and notice of the fact
is given to the public; or by an officer acting under an order of court.
Section 541.07 reads:
"Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any com-
modity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to
the provisions of this chapter, whether the person so advertising, offering for
sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, and whether the particular
lot of such commodity so advertised, offered for sale or sold was or was not at
any time sold to a party to a contract that stipulated the price of such com-
modity under the provisions of this chapter is unfair competition and is action-
able at the suit of any person damaged thereby."
Section 541.08 provides:
"This chapter shall not apply to any contract or agreement between or
among producers or distributors or (except as provided in subsection (3) of
§541.03) between wholesalers, or between or among retailers, as to sale or
resale prices."
"140 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949). The decision was rendered April 5, 1949, and rehear-
ing denied May 27, 1949.
"Florida Laws 1949, c. 25204.
""Section 1. Findings of Fact:
(a) It is hereby found, determined and declared that the public interests
and general welfare of the State of Florida will best be served by permitting
the maintenance of minimum resale prices of trade-marked, branded or named
commodities which are in free and open competition with commodities of a
like kind and quality; and
(b) It is found, determined and declared that without minimum resale
price maintenance of trade-marked, branded and named commodities which
are in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class,
5
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II. THE Liquor Stores CASE
In order to consider the constitutionality of the 1949 Florida Fair
Trade Act, it is necessary to review the Liquor Stores case
2 4 in some de-
small retail merchants with limited purchasing power cannot survive the price
wars or price cutting operations of large retail stores which, after forcing the
small retailers out of business by such operations gain a virtual monopoly on
the retail channels of commerce, contrary to the general welfare and public
interest; and
(c) It is hereby found, determined and declared that predatory cutting of
established prices of trade-marked, branded or named products, as a deceptive
means of unfairly luring from competitive merchants their customers, and for
other purposes, has been the most potent weapon to which the great and de-
structive trusts have resorted most frequently, thereby to weaken and destroy
their smaller competitors financially unable to endure resultant losses. By such
misleading practice there is established in the trading area affected a virtual
monopoly of distribution interposed between the producer and the public, by
which the monopolist may extort at will from the consumer, while dictating
prices and product quality dilutions to the producer, all contrary to the gen-
eral welfare and public ,tcrest of the citizens of Florida; and
(d) Such predatory price cutting is injurious to the general public as dis-
tinguished from a particular group or class thereof, and is also injurious to the
good will and business of the producer and the distributor of commodities bear-
ing a trade-mark, brand or identifying name; and
(e) Prohibiting the unfair and discriminatory practice of price cutting of
trade-marked, branded or named commodities which are in free and open com-
petition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by
others will foster and encourage free and honest competition and will safeguard
the general public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies; and
(f) The public interest and general welfare of the State require the per-
missive or optional maintenance of minimum resale prices established in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Act by producers or distributors of trade-
marked, branded or named commodities which are in free and open competition,
as a permanent public policy of the State, at all times, including period of
deflation or inflation; and
(g) This Act is enacted as an exercise of the police power of this State, in
order to serve the general welfare of the citizens of Florida, and with the fur-
ther objective of preventing monopoly."
"Section 10. If after investigation, the Attorney General deems that any
contract authorized by the provisions of this Act prevents competition in the
manufacture, making, transportation, sale or. purchase of commodities of the
same general class or that the commodity covered by the contract is not in
free and open competition with a commodity or commodities of the same gen-
eral class produced or distributed by a competitor of the parties to said con-
tract, he may bring an action in the name of this State to restrain the perform-
ance or enforcement of any such contract."
2440 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
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tail. The plaintiff corporation, a liquor manufacturer, sold certain trade-
marked whiskies to a distributor under a trade agreement not to resell
below a minimum price fixed by the plaintiff. Defendants, who were
retail liquor dealers, purchased some of these whiskies from the distributor
with notice of the resale price agreement, but did not sign the agreement.
Plaintiff brought suit under the Florida fair trade law2 5 to enjoin de-
fendants from advertising and selling the whiskies bearing plaintiff's trade-
mark at a price below the minimum set by the plaintiff. On denial of a
motion to dismiss the bill on the ground that the Florida fair trade law
was unconstitutional, the defendants petitioned for certiorari. The Florida
Supreme Court held that the act was an invalid exercise of legislative
police power in that it violated due process 2 6 and equal protection of the
laws, 2 7 and constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority
2 8
under the Florida constitution.
2 9
Due Process. Three separate opinions,3 0 varying in their bases, reject-
ed the contenton that the statute was a reasonable exercise of police power
in protecting the good-will attending trade-marked products. They rea-
25F.A. STAT. §§541.01-08 (1941). See note 20, supra.
26FLA. CONST. DecI. of Rights, §§1, 12.
2 LA. CONsr. DecI. of Rights, §1.
2 8FiA. CONST. Art. III, §1.
2 Defendants' answer disclosed that plaintiff corporation was one of about forty
subsidiary companies whose parent corporation, through the subsidiaries, controlled
from 80% to 90% of all liquor in the United States. As an alternative ground for
denying relief to the plaintiff, the Court found that the trade-marked whiskies in-
volved were not in "free and open" competition so as to come within the terms of
the statute. It was not, therefore, necessary to declare the statute unconstitutional.
The Court has usually refused to declare a statute unconstitutional when the case
could be disposed of on other grounds. Economy .Cash & Carry Cleaners v. Cleaning,
Dyeing & Pressing Board, 128 Fla. 408, 174 So. 829 (1937).
"°Most of the cases upholding similar laws declare that the primary purpose of
the statute is to protect the property right of a trade-mark owner in the good-will of
his trade-marked product. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,
299 U. S. 183 (1936) ; Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942) ;
Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939); Johnson &
Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 At. 873 (1937); Ely Lilly & Co. v.
Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E.2d 528 (1939); Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug
Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937). In Carroll v. Schwartz, 127 Conn. 126, 14
A.2d 754 (1940), the Court upheld the statute on the basis that it was to prevent
"cut-throat" competition. Justice Barns, in the Liquor Stores case, 40 So.2d 371, 382
(Fla. 1949), stated, "The purpose of such price fixing was to prevent ruinous com-
petition."
7
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soned that in reality the act had the ultimate effect of a price-fixing statute
designed to permit a small group to eliminate free competition effectively,
especially in regard to those retailers who had not signed the price-fixing
agreement. 3 L As such, since it interfered with the freedom to contract
and to deal with one's own property as one sees fit, it could not be sustained
as an exercise of police power3 2 unless economic conditions clearly neces-
sitated such a measure in the interest of the public in general. The Court
distinguished decisions in other states upholding similar laws, on the ground
that they were decided upon an assumption of reasonableness without in-
quiry into that question. It took cognizance of the present economic con-
ditions and concluded that in time of relative prosperity, when supply is
not greatly disproportionate to demand,3 3 there was no basis on which the
Legislature could predicate such an infringement of constitutional liberties,
and that since the statute was in the interest of a limited number seeking
advantages for themselves and not in the interest of the general public, it
was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of legislative police power and,
therefore, invalid.
Equal Protection of Laws. The rationale of the Court in this respect
was that the statute was arbitrary and discriminatory, in that it placed
trade-marked commodities in a position of advantage over non-trade-
marked commodities when there was no real and substantial differentiation
in fact between the two classes of commodities in relation to the purpose
of the statute. Furthermore, to permit manufacturers of trade-marked
commodities to fix prices while denying that right to manufacturers of non-
identifiable commodities was to grant special privileges and immunities not
contemplated by the guarantee of equal protection of the law in the Florida
Constitution.3 4
Delegation of Legislative Authority. The Court assumed that the act
was a price-fixing statute, and that such power could only be exercised by
the Legislature or a duly constituted state agency properly limited in the
"1See note 13 supra.
'2See note 36 infra.
"3At page 383 Justice Barns stated:
"The present conditions are now somewhat reversed as to those of 1939 and
most of the preceding years. We now have a dearth of goods where we had
an abundance in the '30's; and we have money without purchasing power,
where money had a high purchasing power during the '30's."
"'See note 13 supra.
8
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exercise of its discretion; since no basis existed for price fixing by the Leg-
islature, the same end could not be accomplished indirectly by delegating
that power to private individuals. 3 5
The Florida Court has declared that price fixing is constitutional only
when the subject of such price fixing is one affected with a public interest,
either by virtue of the nature of the subject 36 or by emergency conditions
necessitating regulation in order to protect public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare. 3 7 Applying this principle, the Court has held a statute
fixing prices for barbers unconstitutional because public health or welfare
was not affected by price cutting among barbers. 38 On the other hand, a
statute giving a milk board power to fix prices was held constitutional be-
cause milk is a necessary commodity and the public health would be
adversely affected if it were not properly regulated.3 9 The Court, over a
vigorous dissent, likewise held price fixing in the laundry and dry cleaning
business to be valid. 40 Another statute that attempted to limit liquor
retailers to a forty per cent minimum mark-up on the wholesale prices
fixed by the liquor distributor was held unconstitutional, since its only
purpose was to secure a profit for wholesalers and retailers when public
necessity did not demand it.41
The broad language in the opinions on the Liquor Stores case indicates




"6 E.g., Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759 (1938).
"1 E.g., Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control Board, 124 Fla. 797,
169 So. 541 (1936).
"State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936). The statute was
amended in 1941, FLA. STAT. §§476.01-33 (1941), and held constitutional in McRae v.
Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942). This decision seems to be a retraction
from the Ives case, supra. Mr. Justice Whitfield, 'concurring specially in McRae v.
Robbins supra at 121, 9 So.2d at 290, urged the application of Section 30, Art. 16,
of the Florida Constitution, giving the Legislature power to prevent unjust discrimi-
nation and excessive charges by persons and corporations engaged as common carriers
in transporting persons and property, or "performing other services of a public nature."
"Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control Board, 124 Fla. 797, 169
So. 541 (1936). The decision rested largely on Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502
(1934) ; and the Court seemingly interpreted that case as supported by the "emergency"
theory, referring on page 546 to the statute in question as "this confessedly emer-
gency statute."
"Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183
So. 759 (1938), Justice Brown dissenting.
"Scarborough v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 8 So.2d 913 (1942).
9
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its entirety and not merely in regard to the portion of the statute that
attempted to bind those who had not signed such a price-fixing agreement.
The Court predicated all its arguments against the Florida fair trade law
on the assumption that it was a price-fixing statute comparable to those
involved-in other price-fixing cases. 42 Once this assumption was made, it
followed that the constitutional requirements of a price-fixing statute as
set by the Florida Court were not met, since there was no public emer-
gency requiring that competition be regulated in respect to trade-marked
goods. Thus, if the Legislature cannot fix prices on trade-marked goods,
the same end cannot be accomplished by delegating that power to private
individuals, who then would be- given special privileges that are denied
producers of non-trade-marked commodities in substantially similar cir-
cumstances as far as price fixing is concerned. The Court did not, how-
ever, fully justify its assumption that the Florida fair trade law was a
price-fixing statute in the usual sense of the term.
The statute, at least in so far as retailers who sign an agreement are
concerned, is merely permissive and does not in itself fix prices on trade-
marked commodities, nor does it delegate such power to a duly constituted
state agency. 43 A producer is not compelled to make such contracts, as
was the case under an earlier Florida statute,4 4 nor is a wholesaler re-
quired to purchase goods subject to a price-fixing contract. 45 It is difficult
to see how a person can be deprived of free use of his property when he
expressly agrees to a restriction on its uses. 4 6 The cases cited by the
Court to sustain its position involved involuntary price-fixing statutes that
were to be administered by a state agency. 4 7 In one case the Florida
Court expressly distinguished between voluntary and involuntary con-
tracts fixing prices, and indicated that the former might be valid in the
"See notes 38, 39, 40, 41 supra.
""See note 13 supra.
"See note 41 supra.
"'The "refusal to sell" by producers has been sanctioned, in the absence of any
purpose to create a monopoly. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1918).
"6In Bon Ton Cleaners & Dyers v. Cleaning Board, 128 Fla. 533, 176 So. 55 (1937),
the Court held that the appellants were estopped from insisting on the unconstitu-
tionality of a statute permitting a board to fix minimum prices in the cleaning and
dyeing business because they had signed an agreement with other parties in the area
to observe the price-fixing rule. See Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., 88 N. J. Eq.
222, 228, 101 AtU. 1030, 1032 (1917). In respect to retailers who sign the price-
fixing agreement, the statute merely confirms contracts that were generally recog-
nized as valid before the statutes. See note 7 supra.
"7See notes 38, 40, 41 supra.
10
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absence of any economic emergency. 4s Other courts have held that such
statutes are not price fixing but merely permissive in character. 49 The
Florida Court did not show that the Florida fair trade law, though permis-
sive in form, had the same ultimate effect as a compulsory price-fixing
measure.50
The non-signer clause, however, has been the most troublesome part
of the fair trade acts from a constitutional standpoint. Although a statute
is more nearly price fixing in character when it attempts to bind a per-
son to the terms of a price-fixing contract to which he does not agree, 5 ' the
courts of other jurisdictions have interpreted the statute to permit a "con-
dition" running with the sale of the trade-marked goods that may be com-
pared to an equitable servitude. "2  Apparently unwilling to give the
statute a construction that might be constitutional, Justice Barns negatived
this argument by stating that when a trade-mark owner sells his goods he
concomitantly sells the trade-mark without any condition attached.
The Liquor Stores case will be an important landmark in Florida con-
stitutional law. Previous decisions of the Florida Court might be inter-
preted as a deviation from the older and stricter application of due process
to governmental regulation of business.53 The decision in this case, how-
ever, seems to indicate that the Florida Court will not now follow the cur-
rent trend of the United States Supreme Court and other state courts in
allowing the legislative branch a broader discretion in the regulation of
business under a "liberal due process" theory.
5 4
'Scarborough v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 775, 8 So.2d 913, 921
(1942).
"See notes 13, 17 supra.
"'The Court may have felt that such price-fixing contracts are not in a real sense
voluntary, since a small retailer is in a large measure wholly dependent upon large
manufacturers for popular brands of goods, and retailers are at liberty to refuse to
sell if such a contract is not signed. See note 45 supra. As the facts of the Liquor
Stores case did not involve retailers who had signed a price-fixing contract, the Court
was not bound by stare decisis to hold the statute unconstitutional in respect to
"signers." If, however, the Court pursues its assumption that the statute was a price-
fixing statute without reference to the non-signed clause in particular, to limit the
Liquor Stores case to its facts would involve an abandonment of a large portion of
the Court's reasoning in that case.
"XSee Legis., 49 H2Aav. L. REV. 811, 817 (1936).
5Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936);
Ely Lilly & Co. v.-Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E.2d 528 (1939); Chafee, Equitable
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HA.v. L. Rav. 845 (1928).
"See notes 38, 40 supra.
"Carroll v. Schwartz, 127 Conn. 126, 14 A.2d 754 (1940); cf. Lincoln Federal
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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
III. CONcLUSION
The 1949 Legislature added a provision to the Florida Fair Trade Act
that permits the attorney general to bring a suit in the circuit court to
restrain performance of any price-fixing contract when he deems that the
commodity covered by the contract is not in free and open competition
with other commodities of the same general class. 5 5 This provision does
not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative law-making power to
the attorney general. An executive officer may be given the authority to
declare that certain facts exist upon which a statute by its own terms is
to operate. 5 6 Furthermore, the power given to the attorney general is
not to be final but is merely a power to bring suit in a circuit court, where
the final determination is to be made. In reality this provision does no
more than establish a procedure for the enforcement of the Florida anti-
trust laws,57 and does not remove the objection that the fair trade law
was an improper delegation of legislative authority to private individuals.
The findings of fact concerning the act and the statement as to its pur-
pose that were added to the Florida fair trade law by the 1949 Legisla-
ture5s present a more serious problem. Briefly, the law states that small
retailers cannot survive price-cutting practices of large retail stores, and
that unless minimum resale price maintenance is permitted the good-will
of the trade-mark owner will be injured and retail commerce monopolized
by a small group. It further declares that these practices will adversely
affect the general public, both in times of deflation and inflation. Little
is stated in the amendment that the Court did not consider in the Liquor
Stores case and find insufficient to justify price fixing of the sort attempt-
ed. The decisive feature of that case was that present economic conditions
do not warrant legislative interference in such a broad field of commerce
when constitutional liberties are infringed. Since the prerequisite condi-
tions for valid price fixing as set by the Florida Court do not exist, a
declaration by the Legislature that such price fixing is in the public inter-
est is not binding on the Court. The Court considered the Florida fair
trade law on its merits from practically every angle. Whether the decision
was in keeping with modern judicial policy is now immaterial; the Legis-
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 251 (1949); 2 U. or
FLA. L. Rrv. 298 (1949).
"'See note 23 supra.
"'McMullen v. Newman Corp., 100 Fla. 733, 129 So. 870 (1930).
5 7FI.A. STAT. §§542.01-11 (1941).
""See note 23 supra.
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